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More than any other post-conflict environment in Iraq, the complexity of west Mosul and its im-provised explosive device (IED) threat challenges 
our fundamental perceptions and definitions of mine ac-
tion. From here, 400 km north of Baghdad in the al-Maedan 
District on the west side of the Tigris River, ISIS ran its ca-
liphate and made its ill-fated last stand against attacking Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF). 
Context. Clearance operations began in east Mosul even 
as the battle in west Mosul drew to a close. Nearly two years 
later, the al-Maedan District in west Mosul remains in ru-
ins, heavily contaminated by explosive hazards (EH), and 
has served as a virtual laboratory for real time study of EH 
clearance in a complex, urban environment, which begs the 
question: what makes it complex?1 In a word, context. This 
influences render-safe procedures (RSPs) as determined by 
pre-event, event, and post-event phases, along with their re-
spective physical and political factors. 
Reality. Why post-event and not-post conflict? Because 
the conflict continues. Even as UNMAS Iraq operators and 
others undertake ostensibly humanitarian clearance tasks, 
they remain under ISIS threat, subject to last-minute mission 
changes based on daily intelligence reports. Sometimes clear-
ance personnel are targeted because they are perceived as part 
of an opposing, active military force by the very populations 
they serve. 
Objective. According to current U.N. intelligence esti-
mates, between 20,000 and 30,000 ISIS insurgents remain in 
Iraq.2 Their tactics may have changed, but their intent remains 
the same: regain control of territory actively through guerilla 
tactics and intimidation; and passively through their deployed 
IEDs. Until cleared, these IEDs contribute to “destabilization” 
insofar as they deny access to and repair of infrastructure and 
the rehabilitation of homes.3 
Outcome. When viewed from an outcome perspective, 
IEDs are less explosive remnants of war (ERW) and more 
“passive attack” weapons, part of a strategy that is both de-
fensive and offensive at the same time. So long as IEDs remain 
in place, and thereby stall repair of infrastructure and impor-
tant cultural assets—such as mosques and churches—they ul-
timately lead to a political outcome. Despite strong evidence 
of progress and the on-going recovery in east Mosul and 
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elsewhere, returnees living with threats and 1.8 million inter-
nally displaced persons (IDPs), mostly living in camps, blame 
the government for their plight. Those not already benefiting 
from progress to date are dissatisfied and vulnerable to ISIS 
propaganda.4
Factors. RSPs as a function of tactics, type, design, and lo-
cation and/or placement of IED types depend upon context. 
Therefore, to understand EH clearance in west Mosul, the 
community needs to understand the adversaries: their objec-
tives, strategy, tactics, weapons of choice, and how these were 
used over time. The al-Maedan District of west Mosul serves 
as a kind of “time capsule” wherein operators can differenti-
ate the three phases already mentioned: pre-event, event, and 
post-event. Clearance operations to date document the follow-
ing as contributing factors to complex urban environments for 
EH clearance: 
PRE-EVENT FACTORS
• Design. IEDs cleared from sites in Mosul to date can be 
characterized by range and level of technical complexity 
suggesting extremely competent and capable design and 
manufacturing facilities.5
• Detonation. ISIS manufactured timed, victim-
`operated, command-initiated devices to support con-
ventional combat tactics and to enhance combat 
effectiveness or delay/harass opposing forces.
EVENT FACTORS
• Distribution. ISIS deployed thousands of IEDs target-
ing combatants during the 2017 battle to liberate Mosul; 
these contaminate the remains of completely- or nearly-
destroyed buildings and massive amounts of debris esti-
mated at more than 7 million tons.
• Density. ISIS relied on IEDs to defend its forces as they 
withdrew to tighter defensive perimeters in west Mosul; 
mapping the geography of fighting is a strong indicator 
useful in directing post-event survey and assessment of 
EH types and amounts.
POST-EVENT FACTORS
• Dimension. More than any other factor, victim- 
operated IEDs (VOIEDs) hidden in walls, air condi-
tioning units, or under garments hanging on pegs add 
a third dimension to urban environment clearance, fur-
ther complicated by narrow streets, piles of debris, and 
the restricting maneuverability of mechanical assets.
• Biologic. Nearly two years after the battle for west 
Mosul, operators still find deceased victims wearing 
suicide belts by the hundreds, which pose both explo-
sive and biologic threats as well as the need for protec-
tion and coordination of the return of the remains. 
• Security. ISIS continues to use VOIEDs as booby-
traps to deny access to ostensibly liberated areas by in-
discriminately targeting noncombatants as part of an 
on-going guerilla campaign that includes the harass-
ment, abduction, and murder of the local population. 
Meanwhile, clearance teams remain targets for both 
IED and small arms attacks.
Lethality. If these factors can be measured as variables, 
then the UNMAS experience and data compiled from the 
west Mosul clearance operations provides a baseline for for-
mative thinking related to a proposed lethality index, first to 
measure complex environments and, second, to help opti-
mize clearance skillsets and levels appropriate for still-to-be-
defined new doctrine and standards currently lacking in the 
humanitarian mine action community. 
Progression. After liberation in October 2017, most 
UNMAS clearance teams assigned both explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) and IED experts to focus on emergency, first-
responder-type tasks. Where it was safe to do so, UNMAS 
used these emergency tasks to focus on areas of the city most 
affected by fighting to safely remove the most obvious EH 
hazards consistent with U.N. stabilization and humanitari-
an initiatives.
Volume. As of 30 January 2019, UNMAS operators had 
conducted 3,564 conventional EOD tasks and rendered safe 
a range of conventional threats, including mortars, rock-
ets, projectiles, grenades, and 21 air-dropped munitions and 
guided missiles. While small arms and pyrotechnics clearly 
do not represent the same level of hazard to local populations 
as other types of conventional ordnance, in order to eliminate 
the subsequent reuse by ISIS, they cannot be ignored. As of 30 
January 2019, UNMAS operators had removed and rendered 
safe for disposal a grand total of 651,039 threats of all types.6,7
Categories. As of 30 January 2019, UNMAS operators 
had completed 1,092 IED tasks in Mosul alone, and ren-
dered safe and removed 25,302 IEDs of all types (including 
component parts such as main charges or switches alone), 
ranging in sophistication from simple and crude devices to 
technically sophisticated and innovative based on their de-
livery method.7 While IEDs normally are classified as a func-
tion of their means of initiation (time, victim-operated, or 
command-initiated), this classification does not facilitate 
a broader analysis of IED contamination in Mosul. In sim-
ple terms, ISIS developed IEDs to reflect three categories of 
operational requirements:
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1. To support conventional combat with improvised 
substitutes for commercial military munitions and 
ordnance.
2. To enhance combat effectiveness through the inte-
gration of improvised weapons into existing force 
structures. 
3. To delay and harass advancing ISF.
Manufacture. ISIS achieved a level, scale, and quality of 
arms manufacturing—including IEDs—equivalent to con-
ventional arms manufacturers. For example, ISIS manufac-
tured 120 mm mortar bombs to tolerances that—at least at 
a superficial examination—are all but indistinguishable from 
weapons commercially-manufactured to military specifica-
tions and standards. ISIS 120 mm mortar bombs were recov-
ered containing high-explosive (HE) and chemical fills such as 
mustard gas. Many unfired bombs were recovered with quality- 
assurance labels attached illustrating what was a technically- 
advanced manufacturing and acceptance process. A total of 
343 ISIS-manufactured mortars were recovered, including the 
larger 210 mm variants, with most being rendered safe and re-
covered for subsequent disposal. 
Fuzes. ISIS also developed a range of fuzes. Like their 
mortars, these show remarkable consistency based on their 
simple but effective action mechanisms. All improvised fuzes 
recovered by UNMAS operators have 
been point detonating, manufactured 
from machined aluminum or plas-
tic, often with simple creep springs 
retaining strikers into modified 
nonelectrical detonators. Evidence 
gathered from west Mosul shows that 
several variants of ISIS fuzes have 
been used on ordnance ranging from 
mortars to air-delivered munitions 
and rockets.
Modifications. ISIS also modi-
fied other common conventional mu-
nitions, including the ubiquitous 40 
mm grenade found in several modi-
fied forms. The most common vari-
ation replaces a factory fitted fuze 
with fully improvised point detonat-
ing variants; or a second, common 
modification to the existing fuze al-
lows use of the munition as an air-
dropped grenade from drones, or 
simply thrown by hand. 
Air-dropped Munitions. The 
ISIS air-delivered aerial munition (ADIM) is yet another vari-
ant of the modified 40 mm grenade-type weapon, designed to 
be paired with the existing range of ISIS fuzes and attached to 
a plastic body. Explosive fills encountered have included HE, 
ammonium nitrate-based explosives, and modified 23 mm 
high-explosive incendiary projectiles for use as hand-thrown 
and drone-dropped weapons. 
ISIS 210 mm and 120 mm mortar bombs. Note the quality control stickers on the 
tail sections of the 120 mm mortar bombs (center left).
Typical ISIS improvised point detonating fuzes (IDPF).
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Suicide Belts. UNMAS operators recovered and ren-
dered safe 1,142 suicide belts and vests in west Mosul, many 
still strapped to the remains of ISIS fighters. These weapons 
also show remarkably consistent design, utilizing UZRGM-
type fuzes (both homemade and military) directly attached by 
detonating cord taped around HE, normally with added ball-
bearing type fragmentation. These devices are almost always 
recovered in military-style webbing belts and pouches. Clearly 
a weapon of last resort for the fighter wearing them, logically 
they would be self-initiated when either being overrun by ISF 
or while storming fortified positions.
Enhancements. UNMAS operators found and rendered 
safe numerous IEDs designed to improve the combat effec-
tiveness and firepower of ISIS fighters. Evidence to date shows 
these weapons fall into one of two categories: improvised/
modified rockets and vehicle-delivered explosives. The techni-
cal sophistication of many of these IEDs is impressive, both in 
terms of design and explosive effect. Many improvised rocket 
designs also integrated chemical weapons (normally low-grade 
mustard gas) into their warheads.
Launchers. ISIS improvised-rocket designs have been 
analyzed in detail by a number of organizations, includ-
ing UNMAS.8 In one specific clearance operation alone at 
the al-Shifa hospital complex in west Mosul, UNMAS op-
erators recovered and rendered safe nearly 100 improvised- 
rocket launchers along with a large number of used launch-
ers. UNMAS identified and assessed four launcher variants 
that probably entered service in early 2017. Two of the variants 
contain PG-7 and PG-9LR, the other two containing PG-9SR 
and a thermobaric-type projectile. In reality, the ISIS desig-
nated thermobaric warhead is simply another high-explosive 
projectile. Launchers share as common design features a hand-
grip assembly, a 9-volt direct current (DC) power source, tube 
diameter, improvised-fin assembly, and internal configura-
tions (projectile or rocket, improvised propelling charge, and 
counter-mass); however, the sighting system can vary.9 While 
the launchers are intended to be disposable, ISIS instruction 
sheets recovered by UNMAS operators tell users to retain and 
return the launchers, presumably for refill. ISIS videos cir-
culating in 2017 showed what appeared to be rockets being 
loaded into launchers under apparently sterile conditions.10 
Evaluation of these launchers, along with anecdotal evidence 
of their use in Mosul strongly suggests that these launch-
ers were developed to be integrated into infantry-type fight-
ing in urban environments such as Mosul. The ISIS-designated 
thermobaric warhead would seem to be specifically designed 
to attempt to enhance blast effects, particularly when used 
in buildings.
An ISIS-modified, 40 mm high-explosive, dual purpose grenade, probably 
intended for hand delivery.
Typical ISIS ADIMs with ISIS-variant point-detonating fuzes attached. Note 
the driving band of the 23 mm projectile visible through the body of the 
third ADIM from the left.
A typical ISIS suicide belt recovered in west Mosul. Note the dual UZRGM-
type fuzes and the added fragmentation around the pouch-sized main 
charges.
4
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 5
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol23/iss2/5
ISSUE 23.2 @ JULY 2019 17
Vehicles. UNMAS operators also recovered and ren-
dered safe several vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) from 
west Mosul; several others were located in cleared piles of 
destroyed vehicles placed in scrap heaps by ISF mechanical- 
handling equipment, e.g., diggers, earthmovers. Other con-
firmed VBIEDs still remain, as the precarious states of 
partly-destroyed buildings have prevented access for safe 
disposal. Again, the design suggests their intended purpose 
was to enhance combat operations. Variants were rendered 
safe with both manual (suicide) and remote detonation 
mechanisms and explosive effects with the aim of inf lict-
ing mass casualties (via large explosive payloads) as well as 
more targeted attacks via concealed improvised explosively-
formed penetrator (EFP) type devices. 
Switches. ISIS manufactured time-based, command- 
intiated, and victim-operated devices from its factories in 
west Mosul, and then deployed these as part of a delay-and-
harass defense strategy against any ISF assault. 
• Time-based. Although UNMAS operators have yet 
to recover a complete and intact time-based IED, based 
on timer components recovered and analyzed to date, 
ISIS likely deployed a limited number of time-based 
IEDs. Again, analysis of the time-based IED compo-
nents shows a standard ISIS manufacturing technique: 
brown-plastic boxes with hot glue-sealed lids form the 
basis of time switches; written instructions describe how 
to set time delays of up to 90 minutes. Some variants in-
clude electrical “safe-to-arm” switches as well as multi-
ple 9-volt DC batteries wired in both series and parallel, 
obviously to match the intended power requirements 
of the attached circuitry or detonators. Once again, the 
only confirmed timer components discovered and re-
covered by UNMAS operators in Iraq have been from 
west Mosul.11 
• Command-initiated devices deployed by ISIS in 
west Mosul used both wire and remote-controlled (RC) 
systems. Evidence from command-wire-type devices 
rendered safe by UNMAS operators feature relatively 
short lengths of command wire, suggesting they were 
used to carefully and accurately target passing ISF foot 
or vehicle patrols, probably with follow-up small arms 
action. This further suggests that ISIS planned and ex-
ecuted complex ambushes as ISF advanced into west 
Mosul. Main charges used in command-wire IEDs fea-
ture large EFP and “platter-type designs” to enhance ex-
plosive effect, also giving an ability to effectively attack 
armored vehicles.
• Remote-control. UNMAS analysis of three types of 
devices recovered by UNMAS operators in west Mosul:
1. Long Range Cordless Telephone (LRCT). 
Relatively few LRCT devices have been recovered, 
probably due to the fact that they quickly became 
obsolete as the growing mobile telephone network 
in Mosul City was utilized for longer range and 
more reliable communications.
2. Dual Tone Modulated Frequency (DTMF) 
devices have also been used in relatively small num-
bers based on evidence to date. These devices re-
quire entry of coded numbers into a handset and 
transmission for activation and thereby provide a 
high degree of protection against accidental initia-
tion; however, they are highly susceptible to elec-
tronic counter measures as well as environmental 
conditions such as degradation to power sources 
due to weather and time, much like LRCTs. 
3. Mobile Telephones appear to be a default choice 
for ISIS when integrating remote-control switches 
into IED designs. 
Modifications. Recovered mobile telephones (nor-
mally basic, low-cost handsets) were modified in several 
ways. Internal antennas were replaced and devices have ad-
ditional power sources and circuitry to initiate attached 
electrical detonators. 
Among the most sophisticated integration of mobile tele-
phones into IEDs is their use as arming mechanisms for pas-
sive infrared (PIR) victim-operated devices. These designs 
were recovered from a range of locations, including buildings 
Four variants of ISIS improvised rockets, all recovered by 
UNMAS in west Mosul.
A typical ISIS suicide belt recovered in west Mosul. Note the dual UZRGM-
type fuzes and the added fragmentation around the pouch-sized main 
charges.
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where they were connected to large numbers of 9-volt DC bat-
teries thus providing an extended life as an active IED. One 
IED successfully rendered safe by UNMAS contained 22 bat-
teries connected to a Nokia mobile telephone that acted as an 
arming switch for the PIR sensor. 
The dangers in rendering safe any IED containing a PIR 
switch are considerable. While many recovered devices have 
contained batteries with insufficient remaining current to ini-
tiate the attached detonator, others did not. In these cases, it is 
likely that other component failure or environmental factors 
prevented these devices from functioning.
Victim operated. A range of other victim operated de-
vices were rendered safe by UNMAS in west Mosul. In many 
cases, these are deployed to target personnel and are some-
times used to build anti-handling devices into IEDs. Tripwire-
type devices have used clear fishing twine, usually laid across 
doorways, pathways, or other obvious choke points. One 
variant encountered used medical syringes; when force is 
applied to the attached fishing twine, the switch contained 
within the syringe is closed, thus completing an electrical cir-
cuit and initiating the attached IED. Another used integrat-
ed “push-pull” toggle switches with fishing twine. As with 
the syringes, these toggle switches were recovered from trip-
wire IEDs and as bulk components. Both of these switches 
suggest a clear intent on the part of ISIS to target EOD and 
IEDD personnel in operations following the expected libera-
tion of Mosul.
What is clear from the range of IEDs and associated 
components recovered from Mosul is that ISIS effective-
ly produced and deployed a wide-ranging and technically- 
sophisticated IED threat, representing the entire spectrum 
of time, victim-operated, command-initiated, and projected-
IED capabilities. 
Three dimensions. What does this mean in terms of 
applying existing humanitarian mine action (HMA) doc-
trine to the complex EH situation in Mosul? Or, what makes 
Mosul different? 
First, the EH environment is a three-dimensional prob-
lem. EH have been located in sub-surface, surface, and 
vertical/aerial pockets (walls, ceilings, and improvised air–
dropped munitions). The prevalence of metal in the urban 
environment, in particular reinforcement bar (rebar) in 
A typical ISIS mechanical timer recovered by UNMAS in 
west Mosul.
A typical ISIS DTMF recovered by UNMAS in west Mosul.
A Nokia mobile telephone attached to a plastic con-
tainer with 22 9-volt DC batteries inside (top). Mobile 
telephones also have been used as arming switches for 
attached PIR devices (bottom).
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concrete, makes search activities that rely on metal detection 
extremely difficult. 
Second, where the environment degrades detector capa-
bilities, the combination of visual recognition and experi-
ence (i.e., knowing what to look for) become key factors. Safe 
and efficient clearance depends upon highly-trained search 
personnel being able to quickly differentiate between in-
nocuous items and those requiring further investigation. 
Effectively, experience gained from each search contributes to 
planning for the next, to include deployment of search teams 
and assets.
Third, threat assessment is usually considered to be an ac-
tive and dynamic process, but the formulation of a threat 
assessment in post-event Mosul arguably alters the normal 
relationship between the assessed intent, capability, and lo-
cation available to the individual laying the IED.12 Therefore, 
the key challenge to any IED render-safe operation is know-
ing the type of device, its method of initiation, layout, and 
fabrication. 
Reconnaissance. Within a “conventional” setting, 
threat information can normally be established via ques-
tioning of witnesses. However, in west Mosul, local people 
were often not present in their homes when IEDs were laid, 
and many devices were moved as a result of mechanical- 
handling equipment activity or simply exposed due to envi-
ronmental changes. This leads to the logical question “What 
about robots?” No current UNMAS implementing partner 
uses robots for IEDD support, partly due to the cost of even 
small robots, partly for operational difficulties in urban set-
tings, and partly due to the limited (nonexplosive) actions 
that can be safely and effectively delivered from the avail-
able platforms. 
Variables. Findings in Mosul to date suggest a threat 
environment further complicated by a combination of vari-
ables: conceptual, physical, and device-specific. These in-
f luence the threat environment but do not conform to any 
preconceived fixed relationship determined by the design 
or components of the IED alone. Even then, there seem to 
be few constants available.13 
For example, the environment variable may or may not 
cause degradation. Contrary to the argument that batteries 
degrade with time such that they no longer contain a charge 
sufficient to initiate an electrical detonator, evidence suggests 
in the short term this is not true. Recent tests on the batteries 
from a recovered RC armed PIR IED in Rawah (west Anbar) 
show that, despite the device being in place for approximate-
ly two years, each 9-volt DC battery in the device contained a 
full 9 volts of charge. Further, the battery shelf life expiry date 
was indicated as 2021. Evidence collected from other tests on 
recovered batteries provided similar data. 
Constants. Given there is no clear and proven degrada-
tion of battery life as a function of time and/or environmental 
conditions, and therefore, the lethality of the device cannot 
be assumed to be reduced over time, the technical complexity 
of an IED is always a key factor in threat assessment, as well 
as a key determiner of the subsequent RSP.
Competency. Contrary to normal RSPs that usual-
ly would rely on explosive materials, conditions in Mosul 
call for simple tools such as “j-cutters” used semi-remotely 
to neutralize IEDs as well as highly-trained IEDD operators 
with the skills and experience to recognize and render safe 
threats. For example, devices such as the improvised ISIS 120 
mm mortar bombs may contain high-explosive or chemical-
agent (mustard gas) fills. Often only subtle details differenti-
ate between threats, which may or may not be safe to move. 
Hostility. IED operators work in high-threat environ-
ments where render-safe operations expose them to retalia-
tory attacks. In addition, there is always a possibility that the 
security situation within a clearance location can deteriorate 
and the IED operator becomes a target by virtue of the fact 
that they are clearing IEDs. 
An ISIS “push-pull” toggle switch before and after remov-
al of tape.
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Characteristics. For purposes of EH clearance, west 
Mosul can be characterized as a complex environment based 
on the following factors:
1. A diverse range of complex IEDs.
2. The quantity of IED threats and other EH threats present.
3. The three-dimensional exposure.
4. Accessibility to clearance sites for threat assessment. 
5. Reliance on semi-remote means for neutralization.
6. Extreme consequences of accidental initiation.
Differentiation. The complex threat environment, as 
with all environments, should drive the selection of person-
nel, equipment, and training as well as standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) and operational-review processes. 
Experience. The implications of differentiating between 
simple and complex threat environments in terms of assets to 
perform adequate, safe, and cost-effective render-safe opera-
tions, likely focus on IED operators and their experience re-
gardless of local or international status. Moreover, qualified 
personnel must be present at task locations at all times to pro-
vide oversight of threat assessment and the conduct of search 
and subsequent RSPs. The economic implications should be 
as obvious as they are inescapable: the more experienced the 
operator, the safer and quicker clearance will be, albeit more 
costly the task. While the competencies for IED operators are 
discussed and described in IMAS and U.N. standards, the re-
quirements of a complex environment suggest those selected 
both as international technical advisors as well as local nation-
al IED operators should be carefully considered, tested, and 
evaluated based on demonstrated skills in line with overarch-
ing competencies described in IMAS and U.N. standards.14,15 
Conclusions. What are the implications for future EH 
clearance activities in complex urban environments? Facts 
and analysis support the following conclusions.
1. IED clearance activities should be considered as a func-
tion of technical complexity rather than threat assess-
ment. 
2. While the perception of threat to an IED operator from 
a device may decrease over time in the post-event envi-
ronment, facts suggest devices remain lethal in the long 
term.
3. The EH context as determined by pre-event, event, and 
post-event phases and related factors establish a context 
for threat assessment and appropriate RSPs.
4. Existing HMA doctrine will need to change to reflect 
this new operating reality. UNMAS is currently linking 
the development of standard working practices—for ex-
ample, linking “residential area search and clearance” 
to both IMAS and implementing partner SOPs based 
on experience gained during operations to date in both 
simple and complex environments.
5. The concept of complex environments, compared to the 
simple environments (see previous article), becomes a 
key aspect not only for capacity development but re-
cruitment and selection of IEDD operators. Future work 
plans are now carefully tailoring implementing partner 
capabilities to match the operational environment.
6. The need for continued research and analysis of 
ongoing operations should include a lethality index 
based on the pre-event, event, and post-event phases 
and related factors identified as a gauge to assess future 
operations and task difficulty, also important as a basis 
to establish and report efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
To be continued. 
See endnotes page 60
A “j-cutter” positioned prior to semi-remotely cutting a 
single electrical wire connecting a power source to an IED.
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